The Phillips curve and US monetary policy: what the FOMC transcripts tell us by Ellen E. Meade & Daniel L. Thornton
      Research Division 
          Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 





The Phillips Curve and US Monetary Policy: 






Ellen E. Meade 
and 














FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
P.O. Box 442  
St. Louis, MO 63166 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 




The Phillips Curve and US Monetary Policy: 





Ellen E. Meade 
meade@american.edu  
 









JEL codes: E31, E37, E52, E58 




                                                 
∗ The authors are Associate Professor of Economics, American University, and Vice President and 
Economic Advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, respectively. We thank Ellis Tallman for extensive 
discussions, Jan Marc Berk, James Forder, Bill Scarth, and seminar participants at the Netherlands Bank for 
comments, and Aditya Gummadavelli and Aaron Albert for expert research assistance. 
  The Phillips curve framework, which includes the output gap and natural rate 
hypothesis, plays a central role in the canonical macroeconomic model used in analyses 
of monetary policy. It is now well understood that real-time data must be used to evaluate 
historical monetary policy. We believe that it is equally important that macroeconomic 
models used to evaluate historical monetary policy reflect  the  framework that 
policymakers used to formulate that policy. To that end, we use the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) transcripts to examine the role that the Phillips curve framework 
played in Fed policymaking from 1982 through 2003. The FOMC’s transcripts allow us 
to trace the evolution in policymakers’ discussion of the Phillips curve framework over 
time.  Our analysis suggests that the Phillips curve was much less central to  the 
formulation and implementation of US monetary policy than it is in models commonly 
used to evaluate that policy.   1 
 
1.  Introduction 
The economic concept known as the “Phillips curve” celebrated its 50
th birthday 
in 2008. In 1958, New Zealand economist A.W.H. Phillips (Phillips, 1958) documented a 
negative relationship between unemployment and wage inflation in the United Kingdom 
over a nearly 100-year period (1861 to 1957).
1 The Phillips curve concept has been re-
defined with the advancement of economic thought, and remains important and 
influential in the canonical macroeconomic model and in most discussions of monetary 
policy. In the canonical model, the Phillips curve relates some measure of slack in the 
real economy – the output gap or deviation of unemployment from its natural rate – to 
present or expected future inflation in some form of the expectations-augmented Phillips 
curve.
2 The Phillips curve is also a key component of most models of a central bank 
reaction function, which typically rely on some form of a Taylor rule.
3
Following the work of Orphanides (2001, 2005) and others, it is now well 
understood that researchers must use real-time data (that is, the data that policymakers 
actually observed) in order to analyze policy decisions. We believe that it is at least as 
important – and perhaps even more important – that the model used to analyze monetary 
policy reflect the framework that policymakers actually relied upon when making such 
decisions. Given the importance of the Phillips curve in analyses of monetary policy, we 
investigate the role that the Phillips curve framework played in Federal Reserve 
 
                                                 
1 Robert King (2008) provides a nice discussion of Phillips’ original work and the chronological 
development of the Phillips curve concept. 
2 The seminal contributions of Milton Friedman (1968) and Edmund Phelps (1967) led to the distinction 
between the “short-run” Phillips curve and its “long-run” variant. Because of this work, the standard 
Phillips curve uses the deviation of unemployment from its estimated natural rate or the deviation of output 
from its estimated potential level, long-run levels that constrain the performance of the real economy. 
3 This need not be independent of the Phillips curve because a positive coefficient on the output gap in a 
Taylor rule can occur, even if policymakers place no importance on economic stabilization, given the role 
that the gap in determining inflation via the Phillips curve.   2 
policymaking from 1982 through 2003. We do this by analyzing the verbatim transcripts 
of meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Our document analysis is 
supplemented by an analysis of forecasts of inflation, unemployment, and the output gap 
formulated by the Federal Reserve Board staff and included in the “Greenbook.”
4
To preview our findings, at an abstract level it is clear that most policymakers 
thought that inflation should be related to the gap between aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply. Nevertheless, the transcripts show wide differences of opinion among 
policymakers about the usefulness of gap measures – the output gap, NAIRU, or potential 
output – for explaining or predicting inflation and, consequently, for making monetary 
policy decisions. Indeed, some FOMC meetings were punctuated by debate about the 
relevance of the Phillips curve concept, with policymakers dividing into “pro” and “con” 
camps. Overall our analysis suggests that the Phillips curve framework appears to have 
played a much less prominent role in Fed policymaking than it does in macroeconomic 
models used to evaluate Fed policy. This finding is supported by an investigation of the 
role that the Phillips curve played in Greenbook inflation forecasts. Our analysis suggests 
that the contribution of the output gap to Greenbook inflation forecasts declined over the 
sample period, paralleling a rise in the frequency of discussion about the usefulness 
Phillips curve framework. 
 While 
these forecasts do not necessarily reflect the views of Committee members about the role 
of the Phillips curve framework in the policymaking process, they constitute a starting 
point for the policy discussion of the economic and inflation outlook at FOMC meetings. 
                                                 
4 The Greenbook includes a detailed forecast for the US economy and is given to policymakers prior to the 
FOMC meeting.   3 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature. Section 3 explains how we analyzed the FOMC transcripts and 
documents the evolution of the discussion of the Phillips curve in FOMC deliberations. 
Section 4 presents an empirical analysis of the Federal Reserve Board staff’s forecast for 
inflation. Section 5 concludes. 
In a recent paper, Robert King (2008) provides an excellent historical overview of 
the Phillips curve for the US economy from 1958 to 1996. His analysis focuses on the 
role of the Phillips curve in academic and central bank research, but provides little insight 
into the role that Phillips curve analyses played in policymaking. Our analysis extends 
King’s by investigating the extent to which policymakers relied on the Phillips curve 
framework in making policy decisions. Ideally, one would like to determine the role 
Phillips curve analyses played in setting the target for the Federal funds rate. This cannot 
be done for at least three reasons: First, as Thornton (2006) has noted, the FOMC’s 
current procedure of targeting a specific value of the Federal funds rate evolved slowly 
over time. Second, while some policymakers clearly found the Phillips curve framework 
useful, others did not. Third, with a few exceptions, it is impossible to tell from the 
transcripts the extent to which a particular policymaker’s vote on the FOMC policy 
directive was motivated by the Phillip curve framework. Consequently, we focus on the 
extent to which Phillips curve analyses were used in FOMC discussions of monetary 
policy and reflected in Greenbook inflation forecasts. 
2.  Literature review 
This paper is part of a growing literature that uses the FOMC transcripts and other 
documentary evidence to analyze US monetary policy. For example, Goodfriend and   4 
King (2005) use the transcripts to examine the Volcker disinflation period in the early 
1980s in order to determine the extent to which FOMC members regarded long-term 
interest rates as a signal of inflation expectations and of the credibility of monetary 
policy.
5
There is a vast literature on the estimation of Phillips curves. Some of this 
literature uses the Phillips curve to estimate the natural rate of unemployment; see, for 
example, Ball and Mankiw (2002) or Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997). Other papers 
focus specifically on whether a Phillips curve model yields accurate inflation forecasts or 
whether some alternative model is preferable; for a sample of this work, see Atkeson and 
Ohanian (2001), Fisher, Liu, and Zhou (2002), and Williams (2006). Modern 
macroeconomic models recognize that supply shocks can affect potential output and 
argue that conventional measures of the output gap significantly overstate its size (see 
Nelson and Neiss (2005), Kiley (2010), and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2009)). 
Unlike these papers, we do not estimate a Phillips curve but instead evaluate the extent to 
which the Federal Reserve Board staff’s inflation forecasts reflected the Phillips curve 
framework. 
 We too are concerned with inflation expectations; however, the expectations we 
care about are those of the FOMC and the process through which Committee members 
arrived at those expectations. 
The methodology 
3.  How did the FOMC use the Phillips curve in policy decisions? 
We have reviewed 22 years of FOMC meeting transcripts in order to catalogue 
and assess the extent to which policymakers relied on the Phillips-curve framework for 
determining policy, and staff used that framework for making inflation forecasts. Rather 
                                                 
5 Both of us have contributed to this literature; see Meade (2005) and Thornton (2006).   5 
than reading entire transcripts for all 22 years, we employed a search procedure to 
identify and isolate relevant portions of the text. The search procedure involved scanning 
each transcript for key words that would be likely to be mentioned in a discussion of the 
Phillips curve. Once a portion of text was identified, we then read the discussion 
surrounding the key word. In some cases, the search yielded an isolated comment or 
question and, in other cases, the search identified a longer discussion (or, less frequently, 
a presentation) involving the Phillips curve or a gap-based framework for forecasting 
inflation. Initially, we considered a large number of key words. However, we found that 
we could reliably identify the relevant discussions by focusing on just four key words: 
“potential,” “gap,” “Phillips,” and “NAIRU.” In the case of “potential” and “gap,” the 
search procedure yielded many false hits. We subsequently narrowed the selection to 
those instances that referred to the Phillips curve framework. 
Overall, we identified over 1,000 interventions made by policymakers in the 176 
transcripts between 1982 and 2003. We defined an intervention as a separate remark in 
the transcripts; each key word was counted once per policymaker intervention, even if the 
key word was used multiple times during that intervention. Table 1 lists the total number 
of interventions made by FOMC policymakers for the four key words by year for the 
entire sample.
6
                                                 
6 We also identified a sizable number of non-policymaker interventions made by staff and other non-
Committee meeting participants, but we do not report them in table 1. 
 In addition, the table includes the number of policymaker interventions 
for each word made during the “policy deliberation” portion of the meeting. The policy 
deliberation is last substantive item on the formal agenda of each FOMC meeting. Before 
the policy discussion, the agenda includes procedural issues, discussion of the staff’s   6 
forecast and economic conditions, and from time-to-time, a special topic.
7
Of the more than 1,000 policymaker interventions, fewer than 30 percent occurred 
when the FOMC was debating its policy options. As we discuss later, starting in 1994 
and continuing for several years thereafter, prominent academic economists were 
appointed to policymaker positions in the Federal Reserve System. With these 
appointments, the discourse in FOMC deliberations became decidedly more academic in 
tone, with much more economic jargon and explicit reference to economic models. 
Importantly, this parallels the increasing attention paid in the economics literature to 
monetary policy rules, and John Taylor’s (1993) well-known rule in particular.
 Interventions 
during the policy discussion are the most relevant because they reflect the policymaker’s 
view about the role of the Phillip curve framework for determining the stance of 
monetary policy. 
8
The early years 
 Not 
surprisingly, we identified far fewer interventions prior to 1994, although most of them 
involved the discussion of economic slack, capacity, or operating potential and its 
implications for inflation. Having defined the methodology we used to extract relevant 
portions of the transcripts, we now turn to a discussion of our findings. 
Table 1 shows that references to the Phillips curve framework were relatively rare 
from 1982 through 1993. There was virtually no mention of NAIRU or “gap.” Moreover, 
very few of the interventions occurred during the deliberation over policy. Discussions of 
                                                 
7 On the formal agenda, the policy discussion takes place during “Current monetary policy and domestic 
policy directive,” which was shortened in March 1999 to “Current monetary policy.” Until 2001, the 
FOMC set monitoring ranges for the monetary aggregates at its January/February and June/July meetings 
and this discussion also preceded the policy discussion. 
8 The Taylor rule was first mentioned in an FOMC discussion by Governor Janet Yellen in 1995 at the 
January 31-February 1 meeting.   7 
economic prospects and current or future inflation sometimes involved an analysis of the 
available slack in the economy, the level of operating capacity, or some measure of 
resource utilization. In most cases, this discussion arose during the pre-policy discussion 
portion of the meeting and was an exchange between a policymaker and a staff member 
who was explaining the approach underlying the staff’s Greenbook forecast. From these 
interventions it is clear that the staff was using some sort of output gap measure to project 
inflation – in other words, a Phillips curve model. One exchange between Federal 
Reserve Governor Martha Seger and staff member Michael Prell in 1988 illustrates the 
sort of Phillips curve discussion typical of this period:
9
Seger: My second question is one involving a statement in the Greenbook that staff 
continue to believe that additional pressure in financial markets would be required to 
slow the expansion, etc. And I guess this goes to Mike: Do you think you’ve seen the 
full impact of the tightening moves that we’ve had to date? 
 
 
Prell: No, but our thought is that even after we have absorbed those, that we will not 
open up enough slack, so to speak, or reduce the pressures on the economy enough, 
to relieve the inflationary pressures. Therefore, we need to hold growth below 
potential for a period of time. What we have in our forecast is a very slight shortfall 
of actual growth from potential and very slight easing pressures on resources. And 
we think that, given the underlying tendencies in the economy, we are going to need 
a bit more restraint to keep things under control over the last two or three quarters of 
1989. 
 
While there was very little explicit reference to the Phillips curve during this 
period, the few interventions that we found were generally supportive of the Phillips 
curve framework. Governor Lyle Gramley, for instance, championed the Phillips curve 
approach at the November 1983 meeting, saying:
10
Well, in light of the results in chart 17, the remarkable thing is how well the Phillips 
curve model has done to explain what actually has happened. It got a little off track 
for a while in 1981, but in terms of the overall performance of the economy from 
1978 on it has done very, very well indeed. So, I think the result that the staff is 
 
                                                 
9 FOMC Transcripts, September 1988, p. 5. 
10 FOMC Transcripts, November 1983, p. 16.   8 
presenting to us is eminently reasonable in terms of outcome. If what you want to do 
is get back to price stability, this is what you’re going to have to suffer. And if you 
want to get back to the natural rate of unemployment, you’re going to have to have a 
worse inflation outlook. 
 
However, there was one policy official who voiced doubt about using a gap-based 
measure to forecast inflation or about the Phillips curve: Alan Greenspan. In March 1988, 
shortly after his appointment as Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Greenspan pointed to 
the difficulty of getting an accurate estimate of economic potential, saying:
11
When we look at capacity – and the Fed is the official source of these data – capacity 
is a very dubious concept. You really don’t know whether or not you have run into 
capacity until you have some objective measures of the inability to meet customer 
orders. That is really what it’s all about. 
 
 
In addition, during the February 1990 meeting, following a question by Federal Reserve 
Bank President Robert Parry about the consistency of the staff’s projected range for the 
monetary aggregate M2 with the forecast for inflation, Greenspan commented that the 
answer “depends to a large extent on the accuracy of the Phillips curve type of model” (p. 
26). Our reading of Greenspan – throughout the entire sample period – is that he was 
eclectic with regard to economic models, including (perhaps particularly) the Phillips 
curve framework. In other words, he used models when they worked but was not wedded 
to them when they went off track. In what follows, we discuss additional evidence of 
Greenspan’s “model opportunism” that surfaces in later years of the sample period.  
The infrequent use of the Phillips curve framework by policymakers generally, 
and especially during policy deliberations, suggests that, while the Phillips curve 
framework was evident in the staff’s presentations of their inflation forecasts and many 
Committee members believed that inflation was or at least should be influenced by the 
amount of economic slack in the economy, its role in the formulation of monetary policy 
                                                 
11 FOMC Transcripts, March 1988, pp. 40-41.   9 
appears to have been limited. While the Fed was focusing increasing attention on the 
funds rate as a policy instrument during this period (Thornton, 2006), there is no evidence 
that it was using any measure of the gap to determine its objective for the funds rate in 
the manner suggested by policy rules that are ubiquitous in modern macroeconomic 
models. 
1994 and beyond 
The marked increase in the FOMC discourse on the Phillips curve in 1994 
coincided with the appointment of Alan Blinder and Janet Yellen to the Board of 
Governors.
12 Blinder and Yellen were strong proponents of the Phillips curve framework. 
Blinder resigned his position in June 1996 just as Laurence Meyer, another strong 
proponent of the Phillips curve framework and a forceful advocate of NAIRU, became a 
Governor.
13 The role of Blinder, Meyer, and Yellen in policy discussions using the 
Phillips curve framework is illustrated in table 2, which shows the proportion of their 
interventions in total interventions for each key word by year from 1994 through 2000. 
From the start, Blinder and Yellen used the Phillips curve framework to evaluate 
incoming data and the Greenbook’s inflation forecasts. In November 1994, for instance, 
Yellen remarked that “the performance of wages and prices accords quite well with the 
predictions of a Phillips curve model in which the economy is currently in the vicinity of 
the natural rate” (p. 30). And, at the subsequent meeting, Blinder made a lengthy 
intervention in response to remarks from other FOMC policymakers that the staff’s 
forecast for inflation was perhaps too modest in light of projected rapid output growth:
14
                                                 
12 Blinder and Yellen served as Governor from June 1994 until June 1996, and August 1994 until February 
1997, respectively.  
 
13 Meyer resigned his position as Governor in January 2002. 
14 FOMC Transcripts, December 1994, pp. 27-29.   10 
Let me take a few minutes to defend the conventionality of the Greenbook forecast 
against some of the objections that were raised…. Simple evidence… is that the 
conventional Phillips curves are fitting this episode extraordinarily well. They have 
very small residuals…. Standard econometric estimates would say that a 1 percent 
overshoot – 1 percent as measured by the unemployment rate [relative to the 
NAIRU] for an entire year – would add about l/2 percent to the inflation rate…. there 
is no particular reason to think that it [the Greenbook inflation forecast] is too low 
rather than too high. It is the best guess… 
 
By the end of 1994, real GDP was close to or perhaps even beyond staff estimates 
of potential output. At the December FOMC meeting, Board staff member Michael Prell 
mentioned several times that the unemployment rate was currently below the staff’s 
estimated NAIRU of 6 percent and had been hovering in that range for several months.
15
By summer, however, the FOMC began to reverse the direction of monetary 
policy. In addition to slowing demand for US exports coming from Mexico’s tequila 
crisis and its knock-on effects in other emerging market countries, the Greenbook’s 
inflation forecast had begun to veer substantially off track – but not in the direction 
feared by the FOMC officials who had worried that inflation was on the rise. Instead, 
actual price and wage growth were lower than expected. Chart 1 shows the evolution of 
the prediction errors in the Greenbook forecast for core consumer price inflation in the 
calendar year following the FOMC meeting (computed as actual less projected inflation) 
 
Moreover, the civilian unemployment rate, which dropped to 6 percent in 1994, fell 
further (to 5.6 percent) in 1995. Consumer price inflation was under 3 percent in 1994, 
but all signs pointed to an increase ahead. Not surprisingly in this environment, the 
FOMC continued its on-going monetary tightening, raising its target for the Federal funds 
rate by 50 basis points to 6 percent in February 1995. 
                                                 
15 In the December 1994 Greenbook, the Fed staff estimated the 1994 unemployment rate at 6.1 percent, 
well above the Congressional Budget Office’s real-time estimate of the NAIRU (just under 5.5 percent). 
See also FOMC Transcripts, December 1994 (for example, pp. 2, 4, and 6).   11 
from 1987 through 2003.
16
In many of the FOMC meetings in the late 1990s, the committee devoted a 
substantial amount of time to debating the limits to economic expansion, the Phillips 
curve framework, and the outlook for inflation. With regard to the first of these, many 
policymakers focused on the precise estimate of the NAIRU (or, less frequently, the 
assumed level of potential output), whether it should be reduced below the 5.5 percent 
that was assumed starting with the February 1995 Greenbook, and how sensitive 
projected inflation was to alternative NAIRU estimates. Many of these interventions 
implicitly accepted the Phillips curve framework so long as the estimate of the natural 
rate or output gap was accurate. Governor Meyer was the most vocal about this issue, and 
the following comment from the February 1999 meeting is typical of his comments:
 The Greenbook over-predicted core inflation for the 
subsequent calendar year nearly every meeting from mid-1993 until the end of 1998, and 
then again in 2001 and 2002, with particularly large errors in 1996 and 1997. It is 
interesting to note that, starting in 1995, the frequency of interventions in the policy 
deliberation portion of the meeting began to rise (see table 1) reflecting debate about the 
estimated value of the NAIRU or potential output and the usefulness of such estimates for 
predicting future inflation. 
17
I would remind you that in the 20 years prior to this recent episode, the Phillips curve 
based on NAIRU was probably the single most reliable component of any large-scale 
forecasting model. It was very useful in understanding the inflation episode over that 
entire period. Certainly, there is greater uncertainty today about where NAIRU is, but 
I would be very cautious about prematurely burying the concept. 
 
 
                                                 
16 The Greenbook forecast for inflation is measured fourth quarter to fourth quarter. Forecast errors were 
calculated using real-time data so that the errors are consistent with those that would have been examined 
by FOMC policymakers and the Fed staff. Our sample period is determined by the availability of 
Greenbook output gap projections and is thus begins a few years later than our transcript search. 
17 FOMC Transcripts, February 1999, p. 118.   12 
Some participants were more skeptical about the usefulness of NAIRU or the gap 
in forecasting inflation. In December 1995, Greenspan noted wryly, “saying that the 
NAIRU has fallen, which is what we tend to do, is not very helpful. That’s because 
whenever we miss the inflation forecast, we say the NAIRU fell” (p. 39). Similarly, 
Thomas Melzer (President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), commented that 
“whenever we get to whatever the NAIRU is, people decide it is not really there and it 
gets revised lower” (July 1996, p. 61).
18
Other policymakers faulted the framework itself. In May 1996, for example, Jerry 
Jordan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, remarked, “Perhaps the staff 
could at least humor those of us with analytical frameworks that differ from the gap or 
the NAIRU approach by including a reasonableness check.” He continued:
 
19
It would say that to achieve a goal for inflation… one would need a specified growth 
in productivity over the interval to 1998. The staff also would indicate what 
counterpart reduction in the natural rate of unemployment would occur and provide 
some idea of the rate of sustained economic growth that would be consistent with 
reaching the inflation goal without reference to the notion of a Phillips curve tradeoff 
or sacrifice of output. Then, I and perhaps others could look at that analysis and 
decide whether it was a reasonable approximation of what was going on in the 
economy in terms of faster growth in productivity, the result of all of the investments 
taking place, and faster growth in capacity than allowed for in the staff model. I 
could decide whether I was willing to base policy on it. 
 
 
Jordan was a frequent critic of the Phillips curve framework and he was joined by several 
other Federal Reserve Bank Presidents including Melzer, William Poole (Melzer’s 
successor), and Edward Boehne from Philadelphia. For example:
20
Boehne: As far as NAIRU is concerned, my personal view is that it is a useful 
analytical tool for economic research but that it has about zero value in terms of 
making policy because it bounces around so much that it is very elusive. I would not 
 
                                                 
18 The Congressional Budget Office’s current estimates of the NAIRU show a downward trend throughout 
this period. 
19 FOMC Transcripts, May 1996, p. 42. 
20 FOMC Transcripts, February 1999, p. 116, and June 1999, p. 106, respectively.   13 
want our policy decisions to get tied all that closely to it, especially when most of the 
NAIRU models have been so far off in recent years. 
 
Poole: I certainly count myself among those who believe that the Phillips curve is an 
unreliable policy guide. What that means is that the predictive content for the 
inflation rate – and I’ll emphasize the “predictive” – of the estimated employment 
gap or GDP gap, however you want to put it, seems to be very low. 
 
Furthermore, Poole argued, it was not the gap or NAIRU but inflation expectations that 
were the key:
21
To make it very simple and straightforward, if we look at this in terms of a Phillips 
curve issue, there is a lot of concentration on growth or on the gap or whether the 
natural rate of the NAIRU has changed. In fact, I think the expectations component 
of the Phillips curve is at least as important and that the best way to understand what 
has happened in the last couple of years is to say that expectations have trumped the 
gap. The reason that we have been able to run an economy as well as it has unfolded 
is that there have been firm expectations of continuing low inflation. But 
expectations will not continue to trump the gap forever. The underlying realities of 
the pressure on resource markets will gradually take hold; and once we lose the 




However, some Board members and Bank Presidents continued to support the Phillips 
curve framework:
22
Parry: … as far as I know, the Phillips curve is still the best model available to 




McDonough: We use the gap between actual and potential GDP as the best tool of 
inflation forecasting. 
 
Minehan: Some people would debate the validity of this structure. Certainly, if we 
continue to have accelerating productivity growth, these estimates of output gap and 
NAIRU and so forth may be wrong. But in a time of uncertainty, it certainly seems 
that relying on constructs that have helped us bring about nearly 20 years of better 
economic conditions—milder cyclical turns, ever lower inflation, lower 
unemployment, and more sustained growth—has validity. It seems appropriate to 
look back on the things that have helped us create the kind of environment that 
President McDonough referred to, one in which more people are working, more 
                                                 
21 FOMC Transcripts, May 1999, p. 64. 
22 FOMC Transcripts, September 1996, p. 13, May 1997, p. 41, and June 1999, p. 112, respectively.   14 
people have that experience of working, and the benefits of growth are shared more 
fully by all. 
 
Although most policymakers pitted themselves firmly on one side or the other, 
Greenspan remained noncommittal about the Phillips curve:
23
I am merely indicating that there is something quite unusual going on here, and we 
have been aware of this for a considerable period of time. As I have argued many 
times in the past and despite the latest set of employment data, employment cannot 
increase indefinitely at the rate it has been increasing. Leaving the Phillips curve 
aside, leaving NAIRUs aside, leaving everything aside, I do not know how one can 
put negative people in an equation and then run it out. At some point, something has 
to give. We cannot increase productivity merely by an act of will. There are upside 
limits, so that if effective demand continues to grow as it has, there is no question 
that inflationary pressures have to emerge. …We cannot keep getting such numbers 
and continue to say that inflation is about to rise. As we keep projecting a higher rate 
of inflation, it keeps going down, and there has to be an admission at some point that 
something different is affecting prices. 
 
 
What is striking in reading the FOMC transcripts is that, by 1999, there was a clear 
separation of those policymakers who regarded the Phillips curve as a still-relevant, albeit 
battered, framework for forecasting inflation, and those who disregarded it but were 
frustrated about an absence of alternative concepts used in formulating Greenbook 
inflation forecasts. 
A particularly interesting discussion of the Phillips curve occurred at the June 
2002 meeting, when Arthur Rolnick, Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, made a presentation entitled, “Are Phillips Curves Useful for Forecasting 
Inflation? 40 Years of Debate.” Rolnick’s analysis, largely based on the work of Atkeson 
and Ohanian (2001), suggested three conclusions: First, the Phillips curve has not been 
stable. Second, unemployment is not useful for forecasting inflation (it cannot forecast 
better than a naïve model). Finally, in the long run, money growth is a more reliable 
predictor of inflation. Nearly all members agreed that the Phillips curve framework had 
                                                 
23 FOMC Transcripts, December 1997, pp. 68-69.   15 
been problematic in predicting future inflation since the mid-1980s. Some (specifically, 
Board member Gramlich and Bank Presidents Broaddus and Minehan) thought the poorer 
performance of the Phillips curve was a result of the Fed’s success in reducing and 
stabilizing inflation – with inflation low and inflation expectations more firmly anchored, 
there was a less reliable relationship between the output gap and inflation. 
Michael Moskow, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, was the 
only member to endorse the continued usefulness of the Phillips curve, saying “there are 
limitations to these Phillips curve types of models, but I wouldn’t discard them 
completely. I think there is some benefit to policymaking from these types of 
approaches.”
24 There was general agreement that money growth determines inflation 
over the long run, but that the monetary aggregates are not useful for conducting short-
run monetary policy. In addition, there was consensus that inflation is determined by a 
variety of factors, but that there were no viable alternatives to the Phillips curve model. 
As President Poole noted, “I think one of the problems here is that, with all the 
difficulties of the Phillips curve, we need a horse to beat a horse. We need something 
better but we don’t have a framework that is a whole lot better. And the framework that 
emphasizes money growth… just doesn’t do the job that needs to be done over the short 
horizon.”
25
Interestingly, Greenspan suggested that the relative failure of the Phillips curve 
since the mid-1980s likely reflected a more general phenomenon, namely:
 
26
that the economic structure that drives this economy is under continuous change... 
until we can find some significant, stable set of relationships that seems to capture 
something fundamental and unchanging in the economy, we will have no choice but 
 
                                                 
24 FOMC Transcripts, June 2002, p. 13. 
25 FOMC Transcripts, June 2002, p. 38. 
26 FOMC Transcripts, June 2002, pp. 19-20.   16 
to move to looking at a wide variety of data and information… A lot of people out 
there are asking why we can’t come up with something simple and straightforward. 
The Phillips curve is that, as is John Taylor’s structure. The only problem with any 
one of these constructs is that, while each of them may be simple and even helpful, if 
a model doesn’t work and we don’t know for quite a while that it doesn’t work, it can 
be the source of a lot of monetary policy error. That has been the case in the past… I 
hope we can find some stable structure out there. I suspect that we will not. 
 
Skepticism about the usefulness of economic models for policymaking because 
the economy was undergoing continuous change was an idea that Greenspan brought up 
from time-to-time in FOMC discussions and is a central theme in Greenspan (2007). 
In this section, we use the output gap from each Greenbook, along with 
Greenbook projections for inflation in the current and subsequent calendar year, to assess 
the extent to which the staff inflation forecasts were consistent with the Phillips curve 
framework. Given its important role in the canonical macroeconomic model and the lack 
of a rival framework, it is not surprising to find that Fed staff relied on the Phillips curve 
framework to explain the Greenbook’s inflation forecasts. This occurred even as 
uncertainty about the size of the output gap and NAIRU increased, and inflation was 
consistently over-predicted. Greenbook forecasts are a combination of model forecasts 
and judgment. As Bernanke (2007) has noted, Greenbook inflation forecasts are “… 
developed through an eclectic process that combines model-based projections, anecdotal 
and other ‘extra-model’ information, and professional judgment,” and that “most of the 
models used are based on versions of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.” Given that the 
forecasts are a mix of model-based projections and judgment, it is reasonable to assume 
that the role played by the output gap and NAIRU would have changed over time. Rather 
4.  Evaluation of Greenbook inflation forecasts   17 
than estimating a Phillips curve per se, we simply evaluate the extent to which the 
Greenbook forecasts reflected the Phillips curve framework.  
Our empirical analysis is confined to the 132 FOMC meetings from August 1987 
through December 2003, a shorter period than we used in our transcript search, owing to 
the limited availability of the Greenbook’s output gap series.
27 We estimated Phillips 
curves using different measures of inflation, but confine our discussion here to those 
based upon core inflation as measured by the consumer price index excluding food and 
energy.
 28 Our output gap data consists of Greenbook estimates for the quarter before, the 
quarter of, and the four quarters following the meeting.
29
We evaluate the extent to which the Fed’s inflation forecast reflected the Phillips 
curve framework by estimating: 
 
, 
where   denotes the Greenbook forecast of core CPI inflation for the calendar year 
following the FOMC meeting and   denotes the projected rate of inflation for the 
meeting year, based upon information available at the time of the meeting.
30
                                                 
27 Both the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis make the 
Greenbook projections available on their web sites. 
 The 
variable  is the Greenbook estimate of the output gap in the 
corresponding quarter relative to the quarter of the meeting. 
28 When we estimated Phillips curves using other measures of inflation included in the Greenbook – such as 
overall consumer prices, the fixed-weight price index, and the GDP deflator – the fit of the equation in 
terms of adjusted   was much lower. 
29 We also estimated an unemployment-based Phillips curve using the Greenbook forecasts for the annual 
unemployment rate and real-time NAIRU estimates produced by the Congressional Budget Office (as the 
NAIRU implicit in the Greenbook is not made public). Due to data limitations of the NAIRU estimates, the 
unemployment-gap Phillips curve is based upon a shorter sample of 104 meetings. Since the results are 
qualitatively similar to those for the output-gap Phillips curve, we do not report them here. 
30 The Greenbook inflation forecasts   and   are on a fourth quarter over fourth quarter basis.   18 
The degree to which the Phillips curve framework is important for the Fed’s 
inflation forecasts is reflected in the estimates of  through  from equation (1). 
Ordinary least squares estimates of the parameters are reported in table 3, along with 
standard errors and other summary statistics.
31
  Given the likelihood that the role of the Phillips curve framework changed over 
the sample period, we estimated equation (1) and the naïve model using a rolling window 
regression of 50 meetings.
 In addition, the table provides estimates 
when the gap terms are dropped altogether and inflation follows a random walk (a naïve 
model). The sum of the   terms in equation (1) is positive, and a Wald test rejects the null 
hypothesis that this sum is zero at the 1 percent level of significance. Thus, output above 
potential contributes positively to projected inflation. 
32
  As a final exercise, we estimate the extent to which revisions in the Fed staff’s 
forecasts of core inflation are related to revisions in their gap estimates: 
 Chart 2 shows the adjusted  from the rolling regressions 
plotted on the end date of the rolling sample. The fit of both models varied considerably 
in the 1990s with a substantial decline in the explained variation of the inflation forecast 
for equations estimated over a 50-period sample that ended between late 1995 and the 
end of 1999, parallel to the time when the FOMC was voicing increasing skepticism 
about the usefulness of the framework. 
   
                                                 
31 The standard errors are obtained from heteroskedasticity-consistent covariances using White’s procedure. 
32 A 50-meeting window spans a little more than six years. Our results are robust to window sizes of 40 and 
60 meetings.   19 
 
where   denotes the change in the Greenbook inflation forecast between the current 
meeting and the same meeting one year before, and the   terms denote the change 
in the estimated/projected output gap between these same two meetings. This equation is 
also motivated by the high degree of persistence in the Greenbook inflation and output 
gap forecasts which could distort estimates of the parameters and adjusted  . If the 
output gap is important for the Greenbook inflation forecasts, then changes in the two 
should be closely linked. Parameter estimates are reported in table 3; a Wald test 
indicates that the sum of the γs is significantly different from zero and the adjusted 
shows that changes in the gap estimates account for about 30 percent of the change in 
the inflation forecasts over the sample period. 
In addition, we estimated equation (2) using a 50-meeting rolling window and 
recursive regressions (the recursive regressions begin with 50 observations), and plot the 
adjusted  in chart 3. Once again, these results are broadly consistent with our reading of 
the transcripts. Revisions in the gap forecasts initially account for about 50 percent of the 
revision in the inflation forecast, before rising dramatically to over 75 percent for the 50 
meetings ending in early 1997. After that, the contribution of the output gap revisions 
falls steadily for both rolling and recursive regressions. 
The FOMC transcripts indicate, perhaps not surprisingly, that most policymakers 
(including Greenspan) believed inflation to be the consequence of excess demand when 
the real economy is at or near full employment. Despite the general reliance on an 
5.  Conclusions   20 
aggregate demand/aggregate supply view of inflation, the transcripts indicate that views 
on the usefulness of the gap between actual and potential output or the NAIRU as a 
measure of excess demand (or as a guide for forecasting inflation) were strongly divided. 
Some thought estimates of the gap were useful for policymaking, while others thought 
that the relationship between gap measures and current or future inflation was so 
unreliable as to provide little or no guidance for policy. In addition, the transcripts 
indicate that, by the late 1990s, attitudes about the usefulness of the Phillips curve 
framework changed. Even those policymakers who thought that the gap measures were 
helpful were keenly aware of the difficulty of obtaining reliable real-time estimates of the 
output gap or NAIRU and, consequently, were more skeptical of their usefulness for 
policy decisions. Our analysis of the transcripts is generally supported by our empirical 
examination of the importance of the Phillips curve framework in Greenbook inflation 
forecasts. Hence, we conclude that the Phillips curve framework appears to have been 
significantly less important in actual monetary policymaking than is suggested by the 
canonical macroeconomic model or by widely-used policy reaction functions.   21 
Atkeson, Andrew and Lee E. Ohanian (2001), “Are Phillips Curves Useful for 
Forecasting Inflation?” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 
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0  0  0  0  0 
1983  2  0  3  0  1  0  0  0 
1984  4  0  0  0  2  0  0  0 
1985  78  0  0  0  6  0  0  0 
1986  5  0  0  0  4  0  0  0 
1987  3  2  2  0  0  0  0  0 
1988  11  2  2  1  5  0  0  0 
1989  11  2  5  0  5  1  3  0 
1990  8  1  4  0  3  0  1  0 
1991  3  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1992  13  2  0  0  3  0  0  0 
1993  6  2  1  1  3  0  0  0 
1994  42  3  10  26  4  0  3  5 
1995  43  9  4  29  13  3  0  5 
1996  42  7  12  36  11  3  2  11 
1997  27  13  8  32  11  4  8  14 
1998  26  1  2  11  5  0  2  4 
1999  30  16  9  35  7  10  9  22 
2000  53  9  3  54  23  8  0  14 
2001  34  9  0  6  2  3  0  1 
2002  36  20  9  15  4  1  0  5 




















* Data collected from FOMC transcripts. Each key word is counted once per policymaker intervention, 
even if the key word is used multiple times during that intervention. Entries are computed using all 
available transcripts of meetings and conference calls in a given year, exclude staff interventions, and 
include Donald Kohn from August 2002 when he moved from the staff to become a Federal Reserve 
official. 
 
**The discussion of policy alternatives takes place in the second part of the meeting and follows the 
discussion of the economic outlook.   23 
Table 2. Interventions by Blinder, Meyer, and Yellen (percent of total interventions) 
 











1995  20.9  88.9  50.0  20.7 
1996  23.8  28.6  16.7  50.0 
1997  3.7  7.7  12.5  56.3 
1998  7.7  0.0  50.0  0.0 
1999  0.0  12.5  11.1  14.3 










* Forecast is for Q4/Q4 CPI inflation in the calendar year following the FOMC meeting. Actual data are as 
published in the first quarter, two calendar years after the FOMC meeting. 
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  Equations: 
  Output-gap 
Phillips curve 
Naïve model  Change in 
core inflation forecast
2 
  Equation (1)    Equation (2) 





  -0.34*** 
(0.086) 
   
  0.46** 
(0.188) 
   
  0.21 
(0.143) 
   
  -0.47*** 
(0.172) 
   
  -0.21 
(0.197) 
   
  0.53*** 
(0.192) 
   
      0.18** 
(0.093) 
      0.14 
      (0.196) 
      -0.06 
(0.256) 
      -0.65** 
(0.315) 
      0.65* 
(0.357) 
      -0.04 
(0.274) 
 
adjusted    0.938  0.865  0.303 
# obs  132  132  124 
 
1Constant terms included but not reported. */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 
Standard errors obtained from heteroskedasticity-consistent covariances using White’s procedure. 
 
2The change is relative to the Greenbook forecast for the same FOMC meeting in the previous year. 
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Chart 2.  Adjusted  of naïve model (green line) and output-gap model (blue line), 
rolling regressions (50-meeting window)* 
 
 
Chart 3.  Adjusted  from Equation (2), rolling regressions (red line) using 50-meeting 
window and forward recursive regressions (blue line)* 
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